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BOOK REVIEW
The Transformation of Threadneedle Street: The Deregulation and Re-
regulation of Britain's Financial Services. By James J. Fishman. Durham:
Carolina Academic Press, 1993. Pp. xii, 316.
Eric C. Bettelheim*
Professor Fishman's book is a useful and well-written survey of the
"Big Bang" in financial services and its consequences for London. Not
only is the style of the book lucid, essential in a work seeking to tell a
complicated story in a manner that keeps the reader's attention, but he
takes the important step of putting the events in the City of London of
the last decade in their appropriate context, both historically and intel-
lectually. Professor Fishman arrived in London in 1986, just as the Fi-
nancial Services Act was coming into force. It was the century's turning
point for the City. Neither the Great Fire nor the Blitz nor any other
event in its prior history had the impact of that statute. It often takes a
foreigner to have the perspective to see the longer term influences and the
comparable developments elsewhere which locals miss, submerged as
they are in the current of events. As a long time resident of London in a
private legal practice advising financial institutions, and, like Professor
Fishman, grounded in the American experience of the regulation of fi-
nancial services, I was pleased to see confirmed by a comprehensive and
objective study many of my own thoughts as to the key sources of diffi-
culty and conflict wrought by the Financial Services Act of 1986. Such
tensions were inevitable, as it was not only the first comprehensive stat-
ute establishing a regulatory system for financial services in the United
Kingdom, it was an attempt at a revolutionary break with the past in a
country whose very identity is tied to a sense of tradition and antithetical
to rapid change.
Professor Fishman discovered that London is deeply influenced by
its past - that it is, in fact, "a latter-day equivalent of a medieval market
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town for global money merchants." He also realized that the story of the
creation of the new constellation of regulatory bodies called for by the
Act could only be understood in the context of the underlying economic,
political and bureaucratic forces which combined to ignite the explosion.
Given the breadth of this task, it is perhaps understandable that Profes-
sor Fishman could do no more than scratch the surface, as well as de-
scribe the basic elements of this brave new world, in 300 pages. For
example, his examination of the role of each regulatory organization
identifies key debates and issues, but the scope of his undertaking pre-
vents real scrutiny of the events and personalities involved. No doubt
others will follow in his footsteps in more detailed and perhaps even
more profoundly revealing ways, but certainly he has established a useful
framework for such analysis, both by scholars and by lawyers.
Although it is often hard for Americans to appreciate, the impor-
tance of London's medieval tradition of regulation of trade by way of
guilds and similar associations cannot be overstated in looking at con-
temporary developments. As Professor Fishman notes, the resistance to
change, the cults of amateurism and exclusivity, and the suspicion of
government are currents which run deep in the British tribal psyche, to-
gether with an instinctive preference for decisions to be made behind
closed doors rather than in the full glare of public proceedings. The Brit-
ish are a discrete and reserved people, as well as a conservative people
with a natural tendency to create "traditions" which may have the trap-
pings of antiquity but in fact are of relatively recent vintage. The Scot-
tish tartan, for example, was created in the mid-nineteenth century by an
ambitious textile manufacturer and was certainly unknown to early Scot-
tish history. By the same token, the tradition of self-regulation in the
City, for all practical purposes, is little more than a century old, and its
antecedents are not those of regulation at all but of trade associations
devoted to promoting their self interest, not the public good. That the
two goals were often confused is understandable, particularly in the con-
text of the radical government of Mrs. Thatcher and the "greed is good"
era; the same tendency leads towards capture of self-regulatory institu-
tions by the industry they purport to regulate. The examination of this
process by Professor Fishman reveals not only an aspect of the past but a
warning as to the future of the so-called "self-regulating" bodies estab-
lished since 1986.
The reluctance to rationalize such "traditional" institutions led to
some of the most spectacular failures and to continuing vulnerability in
the system established to regulate and promote the City as a financial




scribe the much touted and wildly expensive proposal to modernize the
Stock Exchange settlements system, known as "Taurus." I trust he was
amused to hear that, since publication of his book, it was abandoned in
its entirety at an estimated cost of £400 million. This was a perhaps
predictable result of the management and leadership failures of the Stock
Exchange and the inability of the City to displace archaic vested inter-
ests, such as registrars of companies and indeed the Stock Exchange it-
self, to achieve an end universally acknowledged as necessary to the
continuing competitiveness of London as a financial center. Now the
subject of further study by the Bank of England, the most recent promise
is of a partial system which may be able to settle Stock Exchange transac-
tions ten days after a trade takes place, and this only two years from now.
Similarly and of more lasting significance, the authorities have failed
to successfully bring prosecutions in either major or minor frauds, no
matter how egregious or damaging politically they may be. As Professor
Fishman rightly observes, "the failure to obtain convictions of alleged
commercial and securities violators publicly flaunts one of the new sys-
tem's greatest weaknesses: the muddled organizational structure of over-
lapping and competing agencies."
That this muddle of at least six different prosecutorial authorities
continues despite the embarrassments of Guinness, Blue Arrow, BCCI,
the property futures scandal of the London commodities exchange (per-
haps appropriately named at the time "London Fox"), and, most re-
cently, the flight of Asil Nadir from prosecution over the collapse of
Polly Peck, is itself scandalous. There is yet to be heard any proposal for
fundamental reform or serious effort at consolidation of the various
prosecutorial agencies. The muddle is likely to continue for years to
come, to everyone's discredit.
It is with much irony that I recall the intense resistance of the City
in the mid-1980's to an SEC being established in London. Professor
Fishman's discussion of the financial community's reaction to the first
rulebooks effectively conveys both the atmosphere of the period and the
reactionary tone of the debate. Today it is almost the universal conclu-
sion of leading City figures, as well as civil servants and regulators, that
an SEC-type organization is exactly what is needed. Not only would it
serve to consolidate and simplify the system, it might lend it some much
needed credibility. One of the weaknesses which Professor Fishman per-
haps missed, not having lived through the early days of the development
of the FSA, was the apparent head-in-the-sand attitude of the leaders of
the financial sector. Each was convinced that this legislative effort had
little or nothing to do with them, and in any event would not apply to
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their businesses in any significant way. The gap between the City and
Government, which is no more than a mile as the crow flies, seemed
unbridgeable in the early 1980's and was characterized by mutual suspi-
cion and a failure to grasp the lessons of the past, particularly in the
United States.
The City institutions' almost total lack of understanding of the
processes of government and of public administration was worse than
amateur; it was negligent. This was among the primary causes underly-
ing Professor Fishman's observation of the late-in-the-day rush to imple-
ment the rules and to get the new self-regulatory organizations
established, as well as of the resulting conflicts which the rush generated.
The City has only itself to blame and I think it is wrong of Professor
Fishman to shoot quite so often at the easy target of the Department of
Trade & Industry (the DTI). In those days the DTI was the only entity,
aside from Professor Gower's study group, which took the issue of mod-
ernization of financial regulation seriously. It was the only part of the
civil service which made a serious attempt at consultation and self-educa-
tion as it prepared the legislation. The City institutions, with very few
exceptions, treated the Department's civil servants with contempt and
hostility. They were rewarded by a statute which is in my view a remark-
able achievement given the almost enforced isolation in which the De-
partment had to work. By the same token, the Department had
previously not been given the resources nor the personnel by any govern-
ment to vigorously enforce the laws that the FSA replaced. The Govern-
ment under Mrs. Thatcher was preoccupied with stimulating the
entrepreneurial spirit and sense of enterprise which had so badly deterio-
rated under the long decades of consensus over the welfare state and was
reluctant to threaten that effort with zealous enforcement of company
law. The UK Treasury, preoccupied as it was with issues of high policy
such as privatization, treated the DTI with comparable disdain while the
Act was being fashioned. Ironically, last year the Treasury, belatedly
realizing the DTI's importance, insisted that the Department's financial
regulatory functions be moved to the Treasury.
What was also remarkable, and unfortunately only briefly adverted
to in the book, was the blindness of the leaders of the City, particularly of
the Stock Exchange, to the necessary implications of the breakdown of a
fixed commission structure. Its logical consequences of industry consoli-
dation, the need for significantly increased capital for brokers and other
participants, the increased pressure on back-office systems, and the accel-
erated differentiation of professional from private investors, were all un-
anticipated. It is all the more remarkable, given that it was only ten
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years before, on May Day, that the New York Stock Exchange and its
broker members had gone through exactly the same experience, with just
these results. It was with some incredulity that I watched the London
Stock Exchange not only become the first one dominated in its governing
structure by foreign entities, but as it succeeded, during one of the long-
est bull markets of the post-war period, in devaluing its seats to the point
where they only represented a payment of £10,000 to members when
they turned sixty years of age. This was at a time when the seat prices on
the New York Stock Exchange, not to mention the burgeoning derivative
exchanges in Chicago and elsewhere, were skyrocketing. This was not
the result of some clever conspiracy, nor of the astuteness of the staff at
the Bank of England or anywhere in the City establishment. It was the
result of a stubborn refusal to believe that the laws of economics which
operated elsewhere would operate in what until then had been a cozy
cartel.
This was true of other institutions as well. For example, while Pro-
fessor Fishman brings a much needed objectivity to this fascinating story,
he, like others before him, is seduced by the mythology and exaggerates
the abilities of the Bank of England. Its much admired "nod and wink"
method of regulation is necessitated by its essential weaknesses. Indeed,
the chief initial impact of the introduction of the FSA was to exclude the
Bank from many of its traditional areas of jurisdiction. The Bank's
weaknesses are partly the result of statute and partly a result of its quasi-
independent status, subject as it is to Treasury oversight. In the wake of
its mishandling of BCCI and its continuing failure to achieve indepen-
dence from government, it is highly unlikely that the Bank can take on
the broad regulatory role which Professor Fishman recommends. In-
deed, it would now both be too radical by far for the City to entirely
abandon the new regulatory structure and contrary to the European
trend. While it is true, as Professor Fishman observes, that securities
markets had been subject to central bank regulation in many of the conti-
nental European countries, the tendency in Europe now is to separate
securities regulation. France has recently established an independent
agency for the purpose and Germany plans the establishment of a securi-
ties commission modelled on the SEC. In Holland and Italy too, securi-
ties commissions have been created, separate from the Treasury
Ministries and the Central Banks. There is a growing recognition
throughout Europe that central bank regulation is not appropriate, and
indeed is not desired by central bankers, as it would involve them in the
micro-management of financial products and marketing.
In contrast, another of Professor Fishman's recommendations is
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gradually being realized. Further consolidation of the self-regulatory or-
ganizations in the UK is going forward, and the proposed Personal In-
vestments Authority is likely to assume the roles hitherto played by two
of the original self-regulatory organizations focused on retail products.
This attempt to institutionalize the difference between private and profes-
sional markets does have some theoretical attraction but the increasing
role of intermediation between the private and professional markets
played by pension funds and insurance companies may make that dis-
tinction harder and harder to realize in practice. The PIA is probably
not a permanent solution, but yet another way station in the transition to
a single regulatory authority.
In respect to private clients, I believe Professor Fishman confuses
the approach taken by the UK regulators in respect to private investors
with the US experience. In the UK it is not, as he suggests, a policy of
disclosure but rather a fundamental policy of paternalism which has per-
vaded and bedevilled the regulations throughout their implementation.
Detailed rules as to type of investment, diversification, leverage, valua-
tion and trading, discourage innovation even when clearly in the cus-
tomer's interest. The notion that unit trusts, the UK equivalent of
mutual funds, and life insurance products, as presently structured and
sold, are appropriate for the general public, has been discredited time and
time again without penetrating the regulators' consciousness. Even in
the wake of the most recent review of the regulatory system carried out
by Andrew Large, now Chairman of the Securities & Investments Board,
and by the Office of Fair Trading, it is evident that full disclosure contin-
ues to be successfully resisted by the retail sector of the industry. The
real track record of products for the retail market is a dismal one if ex-
amined both from a point of view of return to the investor and the means
by which private investment is attracted to them. There is little sign that
this will be revolutionized in the near future. There is not even agree-
ment as to a common standard of performance results, thus precluding
comparative shopping by investors. A symptom of the failure of collec-
tive investments as structured in the UK, is the burgeoning growth of
offshore funds which attract investors to unregulated environments. This
trend is likely to continue, particularly as investment products become
more widely available throughout the EC. The nursery notion that
nanny knows best is hard to eradicate in the UK.
Perhaps of greater importance to readers of this journal, and an area
which Professor Fishman does not deal with in any detail, is the failure
of the commercial law and the courts to come to grips with the require-
ments of the professional markets in financial instruments. On the two
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most recent occasions that major problems in professional markets have
reached the highest court, the House of Lords, the judges both there and
below have almost uniformly failed to understand or adapt the law to the
changes which have occurred in the last decade. The first of these was
the Tin Crisis on the London Metal Exchange, which essentially ban-
krupted the entire market as a result of the default of the International
Tin Council to meet its obligations, and more recently and more spectac-
ularly the Hammersmith & Fulham case, in which the courts held that
local governments in the UK did not have the power to enter into swaps
and other over-the-counter transactions in their efforts to manage their
debts. In the one case the courts deferred to restrictive doctrine to ex-
cuse their powerlessness in the face of international treaty organizations,
and in the other to a literal reading of statutes enacted long before these
markets developed.
This does not bode well for the now favored distinction between
professional and private markets, either in regulatory or public law.
Both the tendency to over-regulate the financial markets and to resolve
disputes behind closed doors are signs of just how immature the system
really is. The resistance of the City to the need for a constructive rela-
tionship with government and regulators, and to the need for enlightened
acceptance of the inevitability of greater legal intrusion into their affairs
has helped to perpetuate this immaturity. Few if any senior practitioners
have found the time or feel that the effort is sufficiently worthwhile to
participate in a constructive way in the development of regulations, in
the governance of the self-regulatory organizations, or the support of
trade associations in making considered and balanced submissions to the
rule-making or the legislative process. It was noted even as the Financial
Services Bill was going through Parliament that it was the compliance
officers of US firms and American lawyers who made the greatest input
into the consultative and legislative process, recognizing as they did from
their home experience how important such efforts were.
The regulators do not help the process by refusing to provide no-
action advice or to build up a system of regulatory precedents, so terrified
are they of getting it wrong. By the same token, the English judges' con-
servatism and lack of familiarity, both with financial markets and with
white collar crime, continue to eat away at the legitimacy of the system
in both the public's and practitioners' eyes. That the recent regulatory
review, combined with the weakness of the present government, has
again wasted an opportunity for the City to overhaul itself once and for
all and to modernize its institutions, is a perfect example of the English
muddling through; or, at best, a kind of half-hearted pragmatism. In-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:231 (1993)
stead of grasping the nettle and centralizing the regulatory and
prosecutorial functions in a single entity, the plan proposes firmer over-
sight of SRO staff to ensure that they are doing their job. This cannot be
the path either to future competitiveness or to an increased sense of confi-
dence on the part of the investing public.
Time and experience will no doubt improve the efficiency and the
effectiveness of the UK regulatory system for financial services. Perhaps
the next scandal will push it into a stable and workable form. One can,
however, be forgiven for wondering whether in historical terms the effort
will be seen to have been worthwhile, given the increasing centralization
of the European Community and the likelihood that before the century is
out serious proposals will be entertained for a European Securities Com-
mission. Given the US system as a precedent, was it really necessary to
reinvent the wheel? If nothing else, the UK revolution in regulation, and
its repeated revisions of rules and structures, has provided a fascinating
laboratory for testing various models of regulation. As new financial
centers develop in the wake of the spread of capitalism, one can only
hope that the emerging markets and European Community will learn
from the UK experience and not make the same mistakes.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Financial Services Act is a
vast improvement over what went before, and as the new regulatory uni-
verse it created cools down, it will be seen to have been a necessary adap-
tation to the fundamental forces which the computer age has brought to
financial services. The Brits deserve credit for the courage that they have
shown in seeking to regulate the entire range of financial products under
a single statute and to create a wholly new system in a very short time.
Whether the effort was cost effective is another matter. One can only
hope that they eventually adopt the lessons of the Chicago School of
economics and learn to evaluate the costs and benefits of regulations
before they are implemented. This and other issues remain questions for
the future. For those of us who lived through Big Bang and its after-
shocks, Professor Fishman's book is a useful aide memoire, and for those
coming to it for the first time, either as an object of study or a context in
which to work as a professional or layman, he has written the best intro-
duction so far.
